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Reply to Andriy Vasylchenkos Review of
Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism
Nino B. Cocchiarella
Andriy Vasylchenko makes the interesting observation that our references
are frequently emotionally charged. A comprehensive theory of reference, Va-
sylchenko suggests, should include an account of this phenomenon. We agree.
Indeed, as we will see, the theory of reference in conceptual realism can be used
to explain an important feature of our emotional states when we read a novel,
or watch a play, a movie, or even when viewing a painting. This feature, which
in aesthetics is called psychical distance, is connected in part with the di¤erence
between active and deactivated reference in conceptual realism. We will take
up that issue at the end this reply.
There is, however, an important misunderstanding in Vasylchenkos review
of how the notion of existential presupposition applies or, as he claims, fails
to apply to ctional objects and more generally to the abstract intensional
objects of conceptual realism. We will discuss this latter issue rst, and then
turn to the issue of our emotional states and psychical distance when reading
ction or watching a play or a lm, and perhaps even when having an aesthetic
experience in general.
1. Existential Presupposition
The central topic of conceptual realism, as Vasylchenko notes, is predication,
which includes not only predication in language, but predication in thought and
reality as well. The fundamental one of the three, I maintain, is predication in
thought, which underlies predication in our speech and mental acts. Predication
in reality, i.e., in states of a¤airs, is independent of predication in thought
and language, but, on the conceptualist view, we are able to understand and
represent it only by analogy with predication in thought.
The two fundamental parts of predication in thought are referential and
predicable concepts, which are the cognitive capacities that underlie our rule-
following abilities in the use of referential and predicate expressions, or what
in natural language grammar are described as noun phrases and verb phrases,
the two major parts of an indicative sentence. Noun phrases, of course, include
not only proper names and denite descriptions, but quantier phrases, such as
Every painting, Some mountains, A unicorn, Most doctors, Few scholars,
etc.
As cognitive capacities that are intersubjectively realizable, referential and
predicable concepts can be exercised by di¤erent people at the same time as
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well as by the same person at di¤erent times. In other words, referential and
predicable concepts are di¤erent types of objective cognitive universals. In
addition, referential and predicable concepts are complementary, unsaturated
cognitive capacities, which when exercised together mutually saturate each other
and result in a speech or mental act, i.e., a linguistic or mental event. The
exercise of the predicable concept is what informs that act with a predicable
nature; and the exercise of the referential concept is what informs the act with
a referential nature.
The unsaturated nature of referential concepts corresponds to the way that
quantier phrases are unsaturated until they are applied to an open unsatu-
rated predicate expression; and the unsaturated nature of a predicable concept
corresponds similarly to an open, unsaturated predicate expression. Just as a
quantier phrase and a predicate expression mutually saturate each other and
result in a sentence, so too referential and predicable concepts mutually saturate
each other and result in a speech or mental act.
As referential expressions, proper names and denite descriptions initially
are not singular terms on this account; rather, when used in a speech act,
they are represented by a special type of quantier phrase.1 It is appropriate
to do so, moreover, because both a proper name and a denite description
can be used either with or without existential presuppositions, and the way to
represent either case is with a quantier in what has come to be called free
logic(i.e., logic free of existential presuppositions).2 Thus, for example, if the
proper name Socrates is used with existential presupposition in an assertion
of the sentence Socrates is wise, then we can represent this by means of the
existential quantier as (9xSocrates)Wise(x), which is equivalent to the more
usual free-logic expression (9x)[x = Socrates ^Wise(x)].
The two formulations are logically equivalent, but whereas the rst can be
used to represent the cognitive structure of the speech act in question, the lat-
ter can represent only the truth conditions of that act. On the other hand,
an assertion of Pegasus is wingedin which the name Pegasusis used with-
out existential presupposition would be symbolized as (8xPegasus)Winged(x),
which is equivalent to (8x)[x = Pegasus!Winged(x)]. (A similar distinction
is made in regard to the use of denite descriptions, but we will not go into that
here.)
As these examples indicate, proper names, in the logical framework of con-
ceptual realism, occur initially as parts of quantier phrases; but then so do
common names, i.e., common nouns, which include both count nouns such
as unicorn and elephant, and mass nouns such as furniture and water.
Thus, an assertion of (All) unicorns are herbivorous, would be symbolized as
(8xUnicorn)Herbervivous(x), which has the same truth conditions as
(8x)[(9yUnicorn)(x = y)! Herbivorous(x)];
1Proper names do become object terms in a secondary sense in that part of conceptual
realism that contains the logic of classes as many. But then so too do common names.
2See Lambert 1991 for a collection of the more important papers on free logic. It should
be noted, however, that unlike the analysis given in conceptual realism, proper names and
denite descriptions are analyzed as singular terms in all of those papers.
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and which therefore, as with all universal statements in modern logic, carries
no existential presupposition that there are any unicorns.3 I am not sure what
Vasylchenko means in his discussion of this example when he says that the
person who asserts this believes that there are unicorns. In any case, he is
incorrect when he says that an assertion of (All) elephants are herbivorous
would be symbolized as (9xElephant)Herbivorus(x), which says instead that
some elephant is herbivorus, as opposed to (8xElephant)Herbivorus(x), which
refers to all elephants. In both the assertion about all unicorns and the assertion
about all elephants there is no existential commitment to either unicorns or
elephants.
These examples also indicate how the conceptual realist theory of reference
described in my book is based on two levels of analysis with two ways of rep-
resenting logical forms, one that respects the cognitive structure of our speech
and mental acts, and the other that is concerned with the truth conditions and
deductive relations of those acts. The one level belongs to that part of semiotic
known as pragmatics, and the other to the part we call semantics. Theories of
reference in modern philosophical analysis do not generally make this distinction
between levels of analysis, and, as a result, they are almost exclusively theories
of singular reference, i.e., theories about the use of proper names and denite
descriptions as singular terms.
2. Being Versus Existence
Existential presupposition is not necessarily about existence in conceptual
realism, though it can be, and was originally taken to be so in extensional
logic where there is no distinction between being and existence. In general,
existential presupposition is about whether or not existential generalization can
be applied to an object term, and that depends on what the values of the bound
object variables of the existential quantier are taken to be in a given formal
ontology. In actualism, where being is the same as concrete existence, only
concrete existents are values of the bound object variables. But, once tense
and modal contexts are admitted, that is not an appropriate position for a
conceptualist to take.
In conceptualism all of our speech and mental acts are understood to be
inextricably temporal phenomena located in a specious present. Implicit in every
such act are certain cognitive schemata regarding the past and the future as well
as the present. In conceptualism, these cognitive schemata are represented by
tense operators, and it is in terms of these operators that we can distinguish
between what exists now from what did exist or what will exist, where, by
existence, we mean concrete existence (and will take it to be so understood
hereafter).4 Thus, although Socrates did exist, he does not now exist, and,
3Strictly speaking, this formula symbolizes the di¤erent sentence Every unicorn is herbiv-
orous. But this is a di¤erence that requires a discussion of my analysis of plurals that we
will not go into here. The two sentences, even though they have the same truth conditions,
represent di¤erent speech acts. For more on this, see chapter 11, Plurals and the Logic of
Classes as Many, of Cocchiarella 2008.
4For an account of tense operators, see chapter 2, Time, Being and Existence, of Coc-
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strictly speaking, the statement that Socrates is wise should really be that
Socrates was wise.5
Being is not the same as concrete existence in conceptual realism, because
past and future objects, as well as objects that now exist, are taken as values
of the object variables bound by 9 and 8. Existence in this framework is rep-
resented by the object variables bound by the di¤erent quantiers 9e and 8e.
This di¤erence between being and existence also involves a second-order distinc-
tion between predicable concepts in general and those that entail existence, i.e.,
those under which only (concrete) existents can fall and which hereafter we
will call e-concepts.6 Being wise, being an elephant, and even being a unicorn
are e-concepts, for example, because an object must be in the concrete, physical
world in order actually to fall under any of these concepts.7 Being an ancestor
of everyone now existing, on the other hand, is of course not an e-concept; and
there are many other similar concepts that do not entail existence (including
the concept of being an object that does not now exist). With this distinction
as basic, we can dene existence as falling under an e-concept; that is,
E!(x) =df (9eF )F (x):
This analysis explains why existence, which of course is itself an e-concept, is
so di¤erent from most predicable e-concepts. That is, unlike the the ordinary
e-concepts of our commonsense framework, existence, being dened in terms of
a totality to which it belongs, is an impredicative e-concept.
Do realia, i.e., the things that did, do, or will exist, comprise all of the
beings there are in conceptual realism? Well, the part of the framework that
deals with natural realism does recognize that we may want to assume natural
possibilia as well, i.e., the concrete objects that could exist in nature at some
time or other, but which in fact do not such as the atoms of a transuranic
element that might in fact never be produced by any supernova, but which, in
principle, could be produced in natures causal matrix as well of course as the
physical objects of a world alternative to ours in a many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
In addition to concrete possibilia, there are, as we will see, objects that
are conceivably possible in ction and imagination, but they will be abstract
intensional objects and not possible concreta. With  understood as what is
(causally) possible in nature, (possible) concrete objects in general are those
that fall under the concept [xE!(x)]. Abstract objects, on the other hand,
do not fall under the concept [xE!(x)].
chiarella 2008.
5 In general we will ignore the use of tense operators, except when we are dealing with an
explicitly temporal context.
6See chapter 4 of Cocchiarella 2008 for a discussion and development of this distinction
between predicable concepts. Another full development of the logic of e-concepts and concepts
in general can also be found in Cocchiarella 1969.
7Here we must distinguish between being a unicorn in a ctional, mythological story as
opposed to being a unicorn simpliciter. It is the latter that entails existence. The former
entails existence only within the story.
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In any case, because they range over past, present, and future objects, as
well perhaps as objects that could be causally realized in nature, the quantiers
8 and 9 are initially said to be possibilist quantiers in conceptual realism. It
is in terms of these quantiers that quantier phrases are taken as represent-
ing referential concepts; and it is in terms of the existential quantier 9 that
we understand existential generalization, and in that sense existential presup-
position as well. This logic, for reasons explained below, is free of existential
presuppositions regarding object terms. Concrete existence, which is based on
the quantiers 8e and 9e, is also free of existential presuppositions.
Now in terms of the di¤erence between being and concrete existence, Va-
sylchenkos rst premise of the paradox of nonexistence, namely:
(Pr1) When (truthfully) denying the concrete existence of something
(i.e., some being), we refer to what does not (now) exist.
is true in conceptual realism. The second premise, however, namely:
(Pr2) One cannot refer to something (i.e., some being) that does not
(now) exist.
is false in conceptual realism. In other words, with respect to concrete existence,
conceptual realism is inationist, and not deationist.
Vasylchenkos alternative to (Pr2), namely:
(Pr2) One can refer to anything that is, i.e., has being.
is also true in conceptual realism; but then, it is also true in conceptual realism
that one can refer only to what has being. In other words, conceptual realism
is deationist with respect to being.
This stronger deationist thesis contrary to what Vasylchenko seems to
claim is false of Meinongs theory of objects, where, unlike conceptual realism,
there are even impossible objects, i.e., objects (Gegenstände) that are outside
of being(ausserseiend). Indeed, in Meinongs ontology there are even objects
of which it is true that there are no such objects.8
The round square, for example, is a concrete object in Meinongs ontology,
and as such it is both round and square simpliciter. In conceptual realism, it is
at best only an abstract, intensional object of ction, as it is, e.g., in the story,
Romeo and Juliet in Flatland,which is discussed below in section 5 (and in
my book, pp. 165f). As an abstract, intensional object, the round square is
round and square only in ction, and not simpliciter.
3. Intensional objects
Past, present, future and causally possible concreta are not the only objects
there are in the ontology of conceptual realism, in other words. In addition,
there are the object-ed contents of our concepts, i.e., the intensional ob-
jects we purport to represent when, e.g., instead of using wiseor triangular
as predicates, we nominalize and speak of wisdom, i.e., of being wise, or of tri-
angularity, i.e., of being triangular, etc. By nominalization in language and in
thought we purport to transform what is not an object, namely an unsaturated
8Meinong 1960, p. 82f.
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concept, into an object. What this transformation involves is a reication of
the intensional content of that concept into the domain of objects i.e., a rei-
cation of the truth conditions determined by that concept in di¤erent possible
contexts of use. Formally, this transformation is unproblematic for most of the
concepts of our commonsense framework, and that is because those concepts
determine unproblematic truth conditions. But there are some concepts whose
truth conditions lead to paradox when reied. The best known such concept is
the one upon which Russell based his paradox, namely, the concept of being a
concept that does not fall under itself.
In Russells 1903 logical realist ontology, predicates stand for properties and
relations instead of unsaturated concepts; and a nominalized predicate was un-
derstood by Russell to denote the same property or relation that the predicate
stands for in its role as a predicate. In that case, the only way to avoid the
paradox, is to formally acknowledge that there can be no such property as the
Russell property that is not a property of itself. That means that in order to
avoid a contradiction we must restrict the comprehension principle in which
properties and relations are posited corresponding to complex predicates. Rus-
sell did this by constructing a theory of types in which predicates could not be
meaningfully applied to themselves.
The system HST , which is equivalent to the theory of simple types, retains
Russells original context of second-order logic with nominalized predicates, but
avoids the paradox by restricting the comprehension principle by a metalin-
guistic typing device. The system HST  described in my book is not a type
theory, but a second-order logic in which predicates can be applied to them-
selves. But, like type theory, HST  is not based on a logic that is free of
existential presuppositions.
In conceptual realism there can be no doubt that we can form such a con-
cept as the Russell concept of being a concept that does not fall under itself. In
addition, because concepts are unsaturated cognitive structures, what we pur-
port to represent when we nominalize a predicate is not the concept itself but
a reication of the intensional content of that concept. A paradox can then be
avoided in this framework by simply denying that we can consistently reify the
intensional content of every concept.
What that means is that the rst-order logic part of the framework of con-
ceptual realism must be free of existential presuppositions with respect to the
quantier 9. In other words, not every nominalized predicate can be taken as
denoting an intensional object that can be the value of a variable bound by
9. This means that some nominalized predicates are denotationless as abstract
singular terms. In particular, even though the Russell predicate stands for a
concept (as a value of the bound predicate variables), i.e., even though
(9F )(F = [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))])
is provable in conceptual realism on the basis of an unrestricted comprehension
principle regarding the representation of predicable concepts, nevertheless it is
also provable that the intensional content of such a concept cannot be reied
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(as a value of the object variables), i.e.,
:(9x)(x = [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))])
is also provable in conceptual realism, on pain otherwise of contradiction.
The question then is: which nominalized predicates can be taken without
contradiction as denoting an abstract, intensional object? The answer is that
we can obtain the system HST  , which is essentially equivalent to HST
 (and
hence to the theory of simple types), by a special axiom schema, (9=HSCP  ),
that gives us all of the reied concepts of HST .9
Vasylchenkos claim that we can refer in conceptual realism to intensional
objects, or what Vasylchenko calls nonexistents,only without existential pre-
suppositions is simply not true. The requirement that the rst-order logic of
the quantiers 8 and 9 be free of existential presuppositions, and specically
that nominalized predicates can be used as abstract singular terms without
existential presuppositions, is an essential part of this framework.10
There are many concepts in the framework of HST  that cannot be shown
to be reiable on the basis of the schema (9=HSCP  ). The Fregean concept N
of a natural number, which is dened as follows:
N =df [x(8F )(F (0) ^ (8y)(8z)[F (y) ^ Successor(y; z)! F (z)]! F (x))];
cannot be shown to be reiable, i.e., we cannot prove inHST  that (9x)(N = x).
But the slightly restricted alternative concept N 0, dened as:
N 0 =df [x(8F )((9w)(F = w) ^ F (0) ^ (8y)(8z)[F (y) ^ Successor(y; z)!
F (z)]! F (x))];
can be shown to be reiable on the basis of the schema (9=HSCP  ), i.e.,
(9x)(N 0 = x) is provable in HST  . Now although (8x)[N(x) ! N 0(x)] is
easily seen to be provable, the converse cannot be proved unless we assume
that N = N 0. But this is provable, it turn out, if and only if N is reiable,
i.e., i¤ (9x)(N = x) is provable in HST  . The concept N , it should be noted,
allows for an unrestricted induction principle for the natural numbers, whereas
the concept N 0 allows only for a restricted form of induction, i.e., a form that
is restricted to reiable concepts. At this point, it remains an open question
whether or not N is reiable in HST  , i.e., whether or not (9x)(N = x) is
consistent in HST  .
The reason Vasylchenko calls the intensional objects of conceptual realism
nonexistents, incidentally, is that as abstract objects it is impossible for them
to fall under the concept of concrete existence; that is,
(8F ):E!(F )
9For a detailed description of (9=HSCP  ), see, e.g., page 299 of Cocchiarella 1986; or
pages 106f and 179 of Cocchiarella 1987.
10Because abstract objects are now values of the variables bound by 8 and 9, it is inap-
propriate to call 8 and 9 possibilist quantiers. But it is di¢ cult to think of an alternative.
Certainly being quantiers is awkward.
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is a basic ontological thesis of conceptual realism.11
Vasylchenko also describes the logical framework of conceptual realism as a
type theory. But as already noted, both of the systems HST  and HST  are
second-order predicate logics with nominalized predicates as abstract singular
terms. They are not a form of type theory in which paradox is avoided by
restricting predicates to di¤erent levels or types in the object language itself.12
4. Deactivated Referential Concepts
Nominalization is the linguistic counterpart of a pattern of reexive ab-
straction in which we attempt to represent what is not an object namely, an
unsaturated cognitive capacity underlying our use of a predicate expression as
if it were an object. It is in this way, according to conceptual realism, that we
are able to conceptually graspand have knowledge of abstract objects as the
intensional contents of our predicable concepts.
It is not just the intensional content of (most) predicable concepts that can
be reied in conceptual realism, however. So too can the intensional content of
referential concepts. And just as the nominalization of a predicate expression (or
the nominalization of a predicable concept in thought) amounts to a deactivation
of the primary role of that predicate (or concept), i.e., its role as a predicate, so
too can referential expressions be deactivated. The quantier phrase a unicorn
in an assertion of the sentence Sophia seeks a unicorn, for example, is not
being used actively to refer to a unicorn, as it would purport to be, e.g., in an
assertion of A unicorn is in the garden. And the same is true in conceptual
realism of all referential expressions that occur as parts of (complex) predicate
expressions or of nominalized sentences, as in desires to be a president who is
admired by everyone, and is loved by every man who loves a woman who does
not love herself, as well as those that occur within the scope of a propositional
attitude, such as believes that a unicorn is in the garden.
The deactivation of a referential concept is based on a double reexive ab-
straction in which a referential concept is rst transformed into a predicable
concept, which then is transformed in turn into an abstract object. The idea
is that just as we are able to conceptually grasp the intensional content of
a predicable concept by transforming that concept into an abstract object, so
too we are able to conceptually grasp the intensional content of a referential
concept by rst transforming that referential concept into a predicable concept,
and then transforming that predicable concept into an abstract object.
Thus, e.g., we can transform the referential concept represented by the quan-
tier phrase a unicorn into the predicable concept of being a concept under
which a unicorn falls as follow:
[x(9F )(x = F ^ (9yUnicorn)F (y))];
which we can abbreviate by simply placing brackets around the quantier phrase,
11See, e.g., page 123 of Cocchiarella 2008.
12The typing that is used in the schema (9=HSCP  ) is a metalanguage device analogous
to that of Quines set theories NF and ML.
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as follows: [9yUnicorn]. That is,
[9yUnicorn] =df [x(9F )(x = F ^ (9yUnicorn)F (y))]:
The sentence Sophia seeks a unicorncan then symbolized as:
(9xSophia)Seeks(x; [9yUnicorn]);
where, of course, it is understood that Sophia is being used with existential
presupposition.13
All quantier phrases occurring as parts of (complex) predicate expressions
are understood to be deactivated in this way; i.e., they are not being actively
used to refer whenever they occur as part of a complex predicate expression or
a nominalized sentence. Of course, unlike the relational predicate seeks, some
relational predicates may be extensional in their second-argument position, as
is the case, e.g., with nds. In such a case, we need to add a meaning postulate
in order to draw out some of the logical consequences of the predicate. Thus,
because the meaning postulate for ndswould be:
[x Finds(x; [9yUnicorn])] = [x (9yUnicorn)Finds(x; y)];
we can, e.g., infer that John believes that there is a unicorn in the garden if he
believes that Sophia nds a unicorn in the garden. Of course, John might well
not believe that there is a unicorn in the garden if he only believes that Sophia
is seeking a unicorn in the garden.
5. The Ontology of Fictional Objects
Vasylchenko is correct in noting that referential expressions in ctional con-
texts are understood to be deactivated in conceptual realism. All of the people
and events we read about in a ctional story are assumed to exist only within
the context of the story; and for that reason all references in the story to people
and events are implicitly understood to be deactivated. Fictional objects, on
this account, are intensional objects: namely, the reied intensional contents of
the referential expressions used to refer to those objects within the ction.
Actually, it is not just in ction that referential expressions are deactivated.
This is true even when reading a newspaper story or listening to the news on
the radio or television. The di¤erence is that when we believe a story that
we are reading, or being told, we reactivate the referential expressions by
understanding the statements made in the story to be true. This is reected by
the formula
True(['])$ ';
which of course is a valid thesis. Here, the bracketed sentence ' is nominalized,
and hence all referring expressions within it are deactivated, whereas they are
in a reactivatedposition in the occurrence of ' on the right-hand side of the
biconditional.
13We might also note that seekslike most, if not all, verbs entails (concrete) existence in
its rst argument position (but not also in its second).
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Vasylchenko is correct in noting that each story can be viewed as a set
of propositions, though, strictly speaking, in conceptual realism a story is not
a set of propositions but a class as many of propositions.14 Vasylchenko is
incorrect, however, in saying that we can associate a possible world with the set
of propositions that make up a story. That is because possible worlds, but not
also stories, are made up of maximally consistent sets of propositions. Stories,
even when they are consistent, do not need to be maximally consistent, and
some can be inconsistent. Indeed, as already noted, some stories can even have
impossible objects among their characters, as, e.g., the round square in the story
of Romeo and Juliet in Flatland already mentioned. In that story, Juliet is a
circle (she has curves), and Romeo is a square (he has angles). Their families are
always feuding, but Romeo and Juliet meet and have an a¤air. Juliet becomes
pregnant and in time gives birth to a round square. The round square is viewed
as a monster by both families and is destroyed, its birth kept a secret from the
world. Romeo and Juliet are also killed, but they are passed o¤ by their families
as ill-starred lovers who committed suicide.
Of course the fact that there is a round square in the story does not mean that
there isa round square simpliciter. Rather, it only mean that the intension of
the concept of a round square can be reied within a story, just the way that the
concept of a unicorn was reied by James Thurber in his well-known fable, The
Unicorn in the Garden.15 This example illustrates how di¤erent our conceptual
realist account of ctional and so-called impossible objects is from Meinongs in
whose theory of objects there isa round square simpliciter.
Finally, Vasylchenko cites Terry Parsonss and E. Zaltas reconstructions
of Meinongs theory of objects. It is noteworthy that in 1982 I showed how
Parsonss reconstruction can be reinterpreted, and in that sense reduced, to
Russells 1903 ontology as reconstructed in HST , a system equivalent to
HST , the logical framework for conceptual realism.
16 In fact, that reinter-
pretation also provides a useful reductive account of Meinongs unexplained dis-
tinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties in terms of the distinction
between e-concepts and concepts in general. In 1990, Greg Landini showed how
E. Zaltas reconstruction of Meinongs theory can also be reduced to Russells
1903 ontology as reconstructed in terms of HST , and therefore implicitly
to HST  as well.
17 In other words, these two papers show how Meinongs
theory of objects, as reconstructed by Parsons and Zalta, can be reduced to,
and explained in terms of, the framework of conceptual realism without any of
the odd consequences of Meinongs ontology.
6. Deactivation as Psychical Distance
Vasylchenko notes that our use of referential concepts, whether in stories,
day dreams, our imagination, or even in our everyday life, are often emotionally
14For a logic of classes as many and it uses in the analysis of plurals, see chapter 11 of
Cocchiarella 2008. For an analysis of mass nouns in the same logic, see Cocchiarella 2009.
15The fable was rst published in 1939 and later reprinted in a number of anthologies.
16See Cocchiarella 1982.
17Landini 1990.
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charged. Such an emotional charge is often an important part of an aesthetic
experience in which we switch from a state of deactivated reference regarding
a representation to a state of activated reference in which what is represented
has taken on a reality of its own.
Sometimes, for example, we become so emotionally caught up in a story
we are reading, or a play or lm we are watching, or even a painting that
we are viewing, that we lose what in aesthetics has come to be called psychical
distance, a suspension of disbelief in which we enter the world being represented
in the story, play, lm, etc.18 When we lose psychical distance we are not only
engaged more emotionally in what we are reading, watching, etc., but we also
switch from a mental state of deactivated reference in which objects in the work
are merely representations, i.e., intensional contents, to an emotionally charged
state of active reference in which the objects are experienced as real, even if
only momentarily.
We may experience fear, e.g., when watching a horror lm, and in those
brief moments when the fear has gripped us, our mental state may switch, and
even utter back and forth, between a state of deactivated reference and a
state of active reference in which the frightening creature is taken as real. We
might switch, in other words, between an adrenaline pumping state of active
reference and a pressure-releasing state of deactivated reference in which we
reassure ourselves that it is only a lm we are watching and not something real.
The di¤erent frequencies of the on-o¤ switch, i.e., of the utter between active
and deactivated reference, explains the di¤erent psychical distances we might
experience; in other words, the varying frequencies explain why it may seem
as though there is a continuum between over-distancing and under-distancing
between oneself and the events being portrayed in the lm.
So too, the characters in a novel we may be reading, or a television soap
opera we are watching, sometimes become so real to us that we begin to view
them and their relations to one another as actual people in real situations;
and we might even begin to admire, or despise, those characters.19 When that
happens we are often, even if only briey, in a state of active reference. As our
psychical distance changes while undergoing an aesthetic experience, in other
words, so too our mental state may change from one in which our references
are fully activated to one in which they are fully deactivated, and the changes
may utter back and forth, giving us an emotional charge that we may enjoy or
sometimes strongly dislike.
There is much more to an aesthetic experience when undergoing a change in
psychical distance than just activated and deactivated reference, to be sure; but
in regard to our present semantic-ontological interest in the nature of reference
to ctional characters, the connection between the phenomenon of psychical
distance and the switch between active and deactivated reference is important
and deserves more study and discussion than we can give it here.
18This notion was rst introduced by Edward Bullough in Bullough 1912.
19Actors playing medical doctors in soap operas often receive mail from fans asking for
medical advice. The fans persist in viewing the characters portrayed as real even after turning
o¤ their televisions.
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